














the	case,	as	both	Poincaré	and	Boltzmann	noted,	that	there	is	a	non-trivial	pattern	of	retention	in	theory-change:	elements	of	past	theories	have	been	retained	in	subsequent	theories	and	are	part	of	the	current	scientific	image.	We	may	conclude	then“by	analogy”,	using	Tolstoy’s	words,	that	“among	the	kinds	of	knowledge	occupying	the	attention	of	our	learned	men	[and	women]	and	called	science,	there	must	necessarily	be	some	which	will	be	regarded	by	our	descendants	much	as	we	now	regard”	atomism,	Newton’s	law	of	gravity,	Maxwell’s	equations,	Dalton’s	laws	and	many	other	components	of	past	theories	that	are	still	with	us	as	part	and	parcel	of	the	scientific	image.	This	is	an	optimistic	lesson	coming	from	the	history	of	theory-change	in	science.	It	might	be	modest,	but	robust	enough	to	be	realist.		11.	I	will	close	with	two	questions	that	Boltzmann	(1902,	256)	raised:			 Is	it	possible	that	the	conviction	will	ever	arise	that	certain	representations	are	per	se	exempt	from	displacement	by	simpler	and	more	comprehensive	ones,	that	they	are	‘true’?	Or	is	that	perhaps	the	best	conception	of	the	future,	to	imagine	something	of	which	one	has	absolutely	no	conception?		His	reply	was	modest:			 These	are,	indeed,	interesting	questions.	One	regrets	almost	that	one	must	pass	away	before	their	decision.	O	arrogant	mortal!	Thy	destiny	is	to	exult	in	the	contemplation	of	the	surging	conflict!			 Boltzmann	took	his	won	life	on	September	6,	1906.	A	few	years	later	the	“surging	conflict”	in	which	he	took	sides	in	favour	of	atomism	led	to	the	vindication	of	atomism.	He	did	not	live	to	see	it.	Still,	his	questions	remain	very	interesting.			
References	Boltzmann,	Ludwig	(1906)	‘The	Relations	of	Applied	Mathematics’.	H.	Rogers		(ed.)		International	Congress	of	Arts	and	Science,	Volume	II,	London	&	New	York:	University	Alliance.	Boltzmann,	Ludwig	(1901a)	‘On	the	Necessity	of	Atomic	Theories	Physics’.	The		
Monist	12:	65-79.	Boltzmann,	Ludwig	(1901)	‘The	Recent	Development	of	Method	in	Theoretical		Physics’.	The	Monist	11:	226-257.	Cornu,	Alfred	(1895)	“Quelques	Mots	de	Réponse	A	‘La	Déroute	de	l’Atomisme		Contemporain’.	Revue	Générale	des	Sciences	Pures	et	Appliquées	6:	1030-1031.	Ostwald,	Wilhelm	(1896)	‘The	Failure	of	Scientific	Materialism’.	Popular	Science		
Monthly	98:	589-601	Poincaré,	Henri	(1902)	‘Sur	la	Valeur	Objective	de	la	Science’.	Revue	de		
Métaphysique	et	de	Morale	10:	263-293	
 Poincaré,	Henri	(1900)	‘Sur	les	Rapports	de	la	Physique	Expérimentale	et	de	la		Physique	Mathématique’.	in	Rapports	Présentés	au	Congrès	International	de	
Physique,	Volume	1,	Paris:	Gauthier-Villars,	pp.	1-29	Psillos,	Stathis	(2014)	‘Conventions	and	Relations	in	Poincaré's	Philosophy	of		Science’.	Methode-Analytic	Perspectives	3:	98-140.		
Psillos,	Stathis	(2011)	‘Moving	Molecules	Above	the	Scientific	Horizon:	On	Perrin’s		Case	for	Realism’.	Journal	for	General	Philosophy	of	Science,	42:	339-363.	Psillos,	Stathis	(1999)	Scientific	Realism:	How	Science	Tracks	Truth.	London	&		New	York:	Routledge.	Psillos,	Stathis	(1995)	‘Is	Structural	Realism	the	Best	of	Both	Worlds?’.	Dialectica	49:		15-46.	Tolstoy,	Leo	(1904)	Essays	&	Letters	(Aylmer	Maud	trans.)	New	York:	Funk	and		Wagnalls	Company.		
